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ABSTRACT
Powered by machine learning services in the cloud, numerous learning-driven mobile applications
are gaining popularity in the market. As deep learning tasks are mostly computation-intensive, it has
become a trend to process raw data on devices and send the neural network features to the cloud,
whereas the part of the neural network residing in the cloud completes the task to return final results.
However, there is always the potential for unexpected leakage with the release of features, with which
an adversary could infer a significant amount of information about the original data. To address
this problem, we propose a privacy-preserving deep learning framework on top of the mobile cloud
infrastructure: the trained deep neural network is tailored to prevent information leakage through
features while maintaining highly accurate results. In essence, we learn the strategy to prevent leakage
by modifying the trained deep neural network against a generic opponent, who infers unintended
information from released features and auxiliary data, while preserving the accuracy of the model as
much as possible.
Keywords Differential privacy ·Mobile cloud · Neural networks
1 Introduction
The landscape of mobile computing has evolved with the recent move of deep learning algorithms from computational
backends to the edge, with a number of optimized engines being readily available to application developers. Despite this
trend, mobile devices are known for the lack of computational power, and thus not suitable for computation-intensive
deep neural network (DNN) operations. Even a single inference step on mobile devices is at least 10 times slower than
that on a computational server.
Instead of storing and processing the entire DNN on the device, a practical approach is to place the computation-
intensive parts at the backend cloud. However, it would be a violation of privacy if we place the entire piece of DNN in
the cloud and ask the user to upload raw data. Thus it becomes a design choice to select which features to be sent to the
cloud for application performance while preserving data privacy. Such mobile-cloud computational frameworks have
been adopted and discussed in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
Although the mobile-cloud computational framework brings performance gains compared to standalone computation on
the device, it may lead to severe information leakage via the features released. It has been demonstrated that unintended
information could be revealed by intermediate-layer representations in [6, 7, 8, 9], and worse still, attackers can even
reconstruct inputs from the features they have access to [10, 11, 12].
As countermeasures, a number of approaches have been proposed, which roughly include two categories: differentially-
private perturbation including [4, 13, 14, 15] as well as cryptographic methods such as [5, 16, 17]. Differentially-private
mechanisms have been applied to the model parameters [13, 14], intermediate features [4], model predictions [15], or
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objective functions [18]. For example, in [4], by nullifying sensitive regions of inputs and injecting random noise to the
intermediate features, the device is able to guarantee strong privacy for any perturbed features sent to the cloud. Despite
its strong privacy guarantee, it is unknown how the perturbed features can guard against any adversary attack. The
methods rooted in cryptography are either computationally intensive, such as BGV homomorphic encryption schemes
[5], or proposed under ideal two-party/three-party server assumptions [17]. Since the mobile device is mostly a thin
piece with limited computation power, it is hard to meet the system requirements on model accuracy, storage, latency,
power consumption, etc. in the implementation.
In view of the seemingly contradictory demands on user privacy and system performance, we resort to the DNN itself to
seek a better balance between the two objectives. We observe that it is inherent to the neural network that its higher-level
features tend to reveal less about the input, but simply offloading higher-level features to the cloud would gain us little
performance advantage. Likewise, features of a compressed neural network reveal less about the input than features
from a wider neural network, yet with a degraded accuracy level. Hence, it is a design choice to select which features to
be sent to the cloud for optimizing the system performance as well as preserving user privacy. Such choices should
be made on demand, since the performance of a mobile application may vary depending on the real-time state of the
system. However, the choice is mostly difficult to make due to the huge search space, or subject to manual selection,
as the relationship between the selection and the combined objective (privacy and system performance) is unclear.
Moreover, an automatic feature selection framework which allows user-defined criteria is preferred as it would greatly
benefit DNN-powered mobile applications.
We propose a novel feature selection and construction framework to automatically reshape the DNN intermediate-layer
features to be sent from mobile devices to the cloud to optimize system performance while achieving the privacy-
preserving goal. We select both the combinations of compression techniques and which layer of features to be sent to
the cloud. The layer selected and the compression techniques constitute the new hyperparameters in our mobile cloud
computational framework. To model customized user criteria on data privacy and system performance, we formulate
the tuning of the hyperparameters as an optimization problem. Since the hyperparameter space is huge and seeking
a closed-form solution is hard, we adopt a reinforcement learning (RL) based optimizer to search for the strategy to
construct such intermediate-layer features to meet our performance objectives.
More specifically, our optimizer searches an encoder structure by cutting from a standard DNN and applying compression
techniques to the DNN stub residing at the device. The encoder is trained together with the remaining parts of the DNN
in the cloud to achieve a satisfactory level of accuracy and is also retrained to prevent a generic opponent who would try
its best to reconstruct the inputs or infer sensitive input properties. Highlights of our work are as follows.
• As far as we know, the work is among the first that preserves user privacy from the neural network perspective,
and in particular, the privacy metric is evaluated as the capability to guard against a generic adversary.
• We propose an RL-based optimizer which automatically searches for the best transformation and placement
strategy of the neural network according to the user-defined criteria and platform resource constraints.
• We implement the optimizer and have it tested on a variety of models and datasets. The experimental results
show its superiority in searching a neural network structure meeting the requirements of accuracy, privacy, and
system performance at the same time.
2 Related work
The related works fall into the following three categories.
2.1 Running DNN with Mobile Devices
While DNN and deep learning algorithms have been widely applied, it still faces significant computational challenges
when migrated to the thin mobile devices. A wide range of solutions has been proposed. From an infrastructure point
of view, Lane et al. [19] were among the first to design a lower-power DNN inference engine on the device, taking
advantage of both CPU and DSP chips to collaborate on mobile sensing and analysis tasks. Later in [2], Teerapittayanon
et al. proposed to divide the DNN into different modules to deploy on the edge-cloud to improve the model accuracy
and fault tolerance while keeping the communication cost low. Considering the resource constraints on the device, our
work falls into the category of jointly deploying DNNs across mobile devices and the remote cloud to enhance running
time performance.
Works such as [20, 21, 3, 22] delved into the trade-off between deploying an accurate model and satisfying system
performance constraints. By applying intelligent data grouping and task formulations, Iyer et al. [21] resolved the
accuracy and latency trade-off in troubleshooting radio access networks using machine learning techniques. Han et al.
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[3] systematically traded off DNN classification accuracy for resource use by adapting to high workloads with less
accurate variants of models. Similarly, Fang et al. [22] dynamically selects the optimal resource-accuracy trade-off for
each deep learning model to fit the system’s available resources. By introducing the cloud into mobile deep learning, we
could partially mitigate the resource-accuracy trade-off, but at the sacrifice of data privacy. Chi et al. [20] proposes an
interactive adversarial training method against feature inversion attack without mentioning the impact of neural network
architectures. Our work is among the first few that not only trains a neural network but also searches structures that fit
best to our privacy objective.
2.2 Privacy Threats in Deep Learning
Abundant evidence has shown that the deployment of deep learning algorithms could potentially leak user privacy.
Among them, we choose two typical privacy threats for investigation: feature inversion attack and property inference
attack. The first category includes works such as [12, 10]. Mahendran et al. [12] proposed to recover the input by
reconstructing intermediate-layer features while Dosovitskiy et al. directly reconstructed the input from features. Both
of the works formulated the reconstruction as an optimization problem. It has been demonstrated that a significant part
of the input can be recovered even from features merely with high-level semantic information.
Examples of the second category include the following. Membership inference attacks [6] could adversarially distinguish
if a specific data record was used in training by exploiting the shadow models. Passive inference attacks [7] inferred
unintended global properties of the training set merely from the trained models. Feature leakage in collaborative
learning [8, 9] pointed out that the adversary could infer properties of a subset of the training data in the process that
multiple users jointly train a global model. Until recently, there is no effective defense against the above two attacks,
and our work proposes no defense but rather seeks a neural network structure that meets users’ privacy requirements
against the two attacks.
2.3 DNN Compression
Our work is also related to a variety of DNN compression techniques. In [23], Han et al. proposed to prune unimportant
model weights to compress the neural network. Along with quantization, their method has reduced the neural network
size by 35 times with almost no accuracy degradation. Unlike non-structured pruning in [23], structured pruning kept
the layer-wise structures intact but shrank the size of the neural network by removing the entire layer or scaling down
the kernel size or the filter number [24]. Targeted at a number of mobile platforms, Liu et al. [25] trimmed down the
network complexity with a number of compression techniques to satisfy resource constraints. While previous works
mostly addressed the model accuracy and compression ratio, user privacy was rarely mentioned. Our work taps into this
line of work to explore the relationship between neural network structures and user data privacy.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we will give a brief overview of the techniques adopted in this paper.
3.1 Architecture Search
Until now, the architecture of most neural networks are subject to manual selection, but there is an on-going trend to
automatically search for optimal neural network structures, of which the accuracy could match the hand-designed one.
However, automatical search faces significant challenges when the state space is huge and the choice of the search space
largely determines the difficulty of our problem. It is often critical to design the action space so that the optimization
method can effectively search in the state space. To address this issue, we propose to compress a large neural network
to a small one rather than growing one from scratch to shrink the search space.
A number of search strategies can be used to explore the search space, such as random search, Bayesian optimization,
evolutionary methods, reinforcement learning, and gradient-based methods. Among them, reinforcement learning
shows competitive accuracy and efficiency. Hence we adopt a reinforcement learning-based approach and carefully
design its action space, state space, and reward function to effectively search for an optimal policy to find a desired
DNN architecture.
3.2 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning is mostly concerned with how software agents take actions in an environment so as to maximize
the cumulative reward. At each state, the agent takes action and communicates with the environment, which returns
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new observation and reward for the current state and action. The agent adapts its policy which returns a new action and
the action would lead to a new state of the agent. The objective of the agent is to learn an optimal policy to maximize
the reward accumulated in the long run.
Since the optimal policy is far too complicated to find, many methods are proposed to approximate one. For example,
there are value-based methods, policy-based methods and combined methods like Actor-Critic. In our work, we adopt
Monte-Carlo policy gradient, a simple version of policy-based method, to search for the optimal DNN structure and
placement strategy across the edge and the cloud.
4 Framework Overview
We aim to design a decision engine that tailors a conventional DNN to the mobile-cloud computational framework
according to some customized requirements as well as resource constraints on the device. The decision engine is trained
offline meeting different criteria sets by the application developer. When a user tries to run inference over DNN across
the mobile device and the cloud, it can select from a variety of settings that meets its criteria. At its core, the decision
engine consists of three modules: a DNN pool, a metric evaluator, and an optimizer. The relation between different
components can be found in Fig. 1.
The DNN pool contains most of the up-to-date standard deep neural networks pre-trained, where we pick our base
models from. Given the base model as its input, the optimizer makes the decision on which layers to retain on the
device and which layers to offload to the cloud, as well as the compression techniques applied per layer on the device.
The output of the optimizer is given in a form of hyperparameters, according to which the base model is modified and
retrained w.r.t. several metrics. The hyperparameters are tuned by the reinforcement learning based optimizer in each
episode to optimize the metrics include accuracy, privacy, storage, etc. Accuracy and model storage can be obtained
easily from the tailored model, whereas privacy is evaluated using the best performance that an adversary achieves with
two state-of-the-art attack techniques, i.e., the feature inversion attack and property inference attack. For presentation
compactness, we refer to the modified DNN stub on the device as encoder, and the attacker’s neural network as decoder.
In a nutshell, our decision engine produces an encoder which 1) satisfies the mobile system requirement at runtime, 2)
yields accurate output when used together with the DNN at the cloud for inference, and 3) preserves input privacy from
the adversary.
Figure 1: Framework overview.
Design space. To summarize, given a base DNN, we aim to search for an optimal strategy to divide and compress
the DNN to obtain a DNN structure spanning across the mobile device and the cloud. Such a structure would meet
our requirements on model accuracy, data privacy, and system performance, which we will illustrate in detail in the
following section.
5 Formulation
As we have shown earlier, accuracy, privacy, and system performance are seemingly conflicting goals to achieve within
one neural network. Hence, we aim to search for an optimal DNN structure and placement to find a sweet spot in
between these objectives. In this section, we will illustrate how we measure or evaluate each metric in our framework.
We define a dataset with m examples as D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)}, where X = {x1, . . . ,xm} denotes the set of
input images and y = {y1, . . . , ym} is the corresponding true label. We use images as example studies but similar
metrics can be applied to other cases. The parameters of the encoder e and the DNN stub at the cloud c are collectively
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represented as θe and θc. The intermediate features output by e is expressed as M = fe(X; θe) whereas c takes the
features M as inputs, and outputs predictions yˆ = fc(M; θc). The accuracy performance is evaluated both on θe and
θc such that:
A = 1−
∑
i
1[yˆi 6= yi]/m = 1−
∑
i
1[fc(fe(xi; θe); θc) 6= yi]/m (1)
Note that accuracy has nothing to do with where we divide between e and c as long as the two parts are trained jointly
as an entirety.
We propose to evaluate privacy by how much a generic adversary could infer any additional information about M
beyond what contains in y. We introduce two categories of attack to the intermediate-layer features by summarizing
from the current literature, but cannot claim it is a complete list.
Feature inversion attack. In this category of attack, the adversary tries to reconstruct the original input from features as
in [10, 11, 12]. For example, Dosovitskiy et. al. [10] uses an up-convolutional network to invert features to minimize
the mean squared error (MSE) of the reconstruction result. We implement the strategy and train a decoder on auxiliary
dataset Xa as follows:
θ∗d1 = arg min
θd1
∑
xi∈Xa
‖xi − fd(fe(xi; θe); θd1)‖22. (2)
Given θ∗d1, we are able to evaluate the privacy loss as the extent that the set of inputs are reconstructed on X
a:
P0 = 1− P ′0/maxP ′0, (3)
where P ′0 = E[‖fd(fe(xi; θe); θ∗d1) − xi‖2]. The closer the decoder reconstructs the original input, the higher the
privacy loss. Some argue that the structural similarity index (SSIM) [26] is a better indicator of the similarity between
two images than the MSE, as SSIM mimics the human visual system highly adapting to extract structural information
from the viewing field. The SSIM we adopted in this paper separate out three factors — luminance, contrast, and
structure — to yield an overall similarity measure. For more detail, please refer to [26]. Hence, the opponent would
devise a decoder to reconstruct the input with the highest SSIM:
θ∗d1′ = arg max
θd1′
∑
xi∈Xa
SSIM(xi, fd(fe(xi; θe); θd1′)). (4)
Likewise, we define the privacy loss as the similarity metric:
P1 = E[SSIM(xi, fd(fe(xi; θe); θ∗d1′))]. (5)
Note that the value of SSIM always lies between 0 and 1.
Property inference attack. In this category, the adversary infers from features about the input properties beyond what
contains in the output, as in works such as [6, 7, 8]. That indicates the adversary capability of deducting additional
information irrelevant to the task. For example, let the task being the classification of a person’s age ranges based on its
facial image. And we would not expect any party to learn anything beyond that. However, an adversary intends to infer
an unrelated attribute, i.e., the gender of the person, from the released features somehow. Hence, it secretly collects a
set of person images with different genders Xa and their corresponding features fe(Xa; θe). The adversary trains a
binary classifier θ∗d2 to distinguish the attribute of genders y
a that:
θ∗d2 = arg min
θd2
∑
xi∈Xa
1[fd(fe(xi; θe); θd2) 6= yi]. (6)
Such a binary classifier is used to infer the hidden gender property from features, by which we define privacy loss as the
inference accuracy on the unintended attributes:
P2 =
∑
xi∈Xa
1[fd(fe(xi; θe); θ
∗
d2) = yi]/|Xa|, (7)
where |Xa| is the total number of instances in Xa. Overall we try to mimic the real-world privacy threats to provide
insights on how the neural network architecture design would affect the privacy performance. In practice, we cannot
control what the adversary obtains in the auxiliary dataset Xa, and thus we assume a worst-case adversary who exploits
whatever it has.
Apart from accuracy and privacy, the running time performance is also one major factor in consideration, as it concerns
with user experience, i.e., how fast the DNN processes the data (latency), how large space it takes (storage), and how
much energy it consumes (energy). All these factors are relevant to the amount of computation on the device: a deeper
or wider DNN stub takes larger storage space and most often involves more computation leading to longer inference
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time as well as higher energy consumption. For simplicity, we adopt the following performance indicators to denote the
running time performance:
S1 = 1− #params(encoder)
#params(total)
, (8)
and in the case where FLOPs cannot be estimated by the number of parameters, we adopt
S2 = 1− MACs(encoder)
MACs(total)
. (9)
MACs are approximated by the sum of MACs in the convolutional and fully-connected layers as follows:
MACsconv = K ×K × Cin × Cout ×Hout ×Wout (10)
MACsFC = Cin × Cout (11)
where K represents the kernel size, Hout,Wout are the height and width of output feature, and Cin, Cout denote the
number of input and output channels of the layer.
Essentially, with a larger S1/S2, the storage or computation costs on the mobile device are lower, with more workload
transferred to the cloud. We certainly can use a more complex latency or energy model for better describing the
performance gain, but that is out of the scope of this work.
To sum up, accuracy A is evaluated on the model jointly composed by the encoder and the DNN at the cloud. Privacy
loss P0, P1, P2 are defined as the amount of unintended information contained in the features released. The worse the
adversary’s performance in recovering inputs or inferring unintended properties of the input, the higher level of privacy
the mechanism guarantees. Performance indicator S1, S2 are concerned with both the compression ratio and partitioning
strategy. Among these metrics, privacy and accuracy are related to both model parameters and hyperparameters, while
the performance indicator is mostly relevant to hyperparameters such as the number of parameters per layer, layer type,
input size, etc. In the following section, we will introduce our reward objective function composed of the metrics and
the strategy design space.
6 Reinforcement Learning Based Optimizer
Our goal is to learn the optimal partition and transformation strategy (policy) pi∗ via reinforcement learning, of which
the major components are as follows:
State: Let the state space S be the one containing all neural network models along with its placement on devices. Each
model is represented by a set of hyperparameters and model weights. For example, a state can be the first 3 convolutional
layers (Conv-layers) residing at the mobile device, with the following 2 Conv-layers and the fully-connected layers
placed at the cloud. It would be a different state if the same model is deployed but only the first 2 Conv-layers are
assigned to the device.
Action: A finite action set A transforms a state from one to another. We consider two types of actions in this work: the
partition of the model across different devices, and model compression. By compressing a base DNN to one fitting the
mobile end, it not only shrinks down the search space but with some accuracy guarantee by the conclusion of [23].
Transition probability and discount factor: Letting the transition probability space be T , we take a deterministic
approach to transform a DNN structure from one to another with probability 1. And we set the discount factor γ to 1 to
make each reward contribute equally to the final return.
Reward function: The reward r : S 7→ R can be factorized as model accuracy, privacy, and performance indicator
aforementioned. After taking each action, we obtain a new state — a new DNN structure and its placement — along
with its associated reward. To explore more DNN structures at one run, we generate more than one new DNN within
each episode and use their average reward as the reward for the action taken. Note that with each action taken, not all
metrics would change. For instance, the action of partition does not change the model accuracy or the performance
indicator, while compression would affect all metrics. Further, we define the intermediate reward to be zero, i.e., the
reward should only be given when the compression procedure is done for all layers, and any intermediate state would
be rewarded 0.
We consider a large reward should be given when the model achieves a high level of all three metrics. If all three metrics
are treated equivalently, we can express the reward in the following form:
R = RA ×RP ×RS = A
Abase
× (1− Pi)× Sj(2− Sj), i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2}. (12)
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RA, RP , RS are all normalized between the value of 0 and 1. With Abase expressed as the accuracy of the base DNN,
RA indicates the ratio between the accuracy of the optimal DNN and the baseline accuracy. Similarly, RP is the
negative of privacy loss. The reward RS is expressed as a concave function of Sj as we assume the performance gain
grows drastically when Sj is small but becomes marginal when Sj is close to 1.
LSTM
LSTM
Hi-1Hi-1
conv_layer, 
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Figure 2: Reinforcement learning based optimizer. Ci represents the compression policy of the i-th layer and P
represents the partition policy.
6.1 LSTM-based Optimizer
Since recurrent neural networks have been widely applied to neural architecture search, for their capability to process
hyperparameters expressed as strings. We adopt the bidirectional LSTM, a type of recurrent neural network, as the
decision engine in our reinforcement learning optimizer.
The structure of the decision engine is given by Fig. 2. The basic unit is a DNN layer, which includes the in-place
operations such as ReLU, batch normalization, dropout, etc. if it contains one. Each layer takes the current state of the
layer as input, feeds them into a forward LSTM and a backward LSTM respectively to compute the corresponding
hidden states Hi. As the change of one layer can affect the layer prior to it or the layer following it, the design of the
backward and forward LSTM ensures such influence is reflected by the Q-network. The hidden states units produce a
number of logits with respect to the partition decision I0 and compression decision I1:C for each layer. For the partition
decision, each logit I0 can be interpreted as the preference of partitioning between the current layer and the following
one. For the compression strategy, we consider each logit I1:C as each layer’s preference over a set of compression
techniques. Finally, I0 across all layers are fed into one common softmax layer to produce the partition decision P ,
whereas Ii,1:C are fed into the per-layer softmax to produce the set of compression techniques Ci for this layer. Given
the produced actions Ci,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P , we are able to transform one DNN model to another along with the
change of its placement, and thus transit to the next state.
6.2 Adversarial Retraining
For each set of hyperparameters (and the DNN placement) produced as the state, we compose a neural network
according to those hyperparameters and re-initialize it for training. According to Eq. (12), the reward consists of
RA, RP and RS . While RS can be obtained before retraining, the former two can only be evaluated after retraining.
In retraining the composed model, we adopt knowledge distillation for better accuracy performance. The technique
labels the training dataset by probabilistic outputs (soft labels) of the corresponding base model, rather than the hard
labels. By Hinton et al. [27], the probabilistic outputs emphasize on the relation between different classes and thus
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provide more information than hard labels to assist training. In our framework, both hard and soft labels are adopted in
the loss function.
As for calculating the privacy, we apply two retraining strategies w.r.t. different threat models. We first consider a
reactive adversary who can only obtain whatever the user outputs from a trained encoder. In that model, the adversary
manipulates the user by intentionally sending inputs to the encoder and retrieving the corresponding intermediate-layer
features from it. By training a decoder over the obtained input-feature pairs, we record the best performance achieved
by the decoder in terms of the input reconstruction error or the property inference error. Such errors are adopted to
gauge the privacy level that the encoder can achieve.
Also, we assume a proactive attack in which the adversary can interact with the training of the composed DNN. In
particular, at each iteration of retraining the composed DNN, the adversary trains a decoder against the current encoder
to minimize the encoder’s privacy gain, and then with the decoder fixed, the encoder is trained to maximize its privacy
gain and final output accuracy. In a nutshell, the encoder and decoder pit against each other to achieve a saddle point in
the following minimax problem:
min
θe,θc
max
θd
(1−A) + Pi, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (13)
In the equation above, the model accuracy A is concerned with both θe and θc whereas the privacy loss Pi is a function
of θe and θd. The formulation resembles the training of a generative adversarial network (GAN) where the encoder and
decoder play the roles of discriminator and generator respectively. In practice, it is hard to train such a minimax loss as
the decoder usually converges much faster than the encoder and the cloud. Thus we adopt similar training strategies as
GANs to slow down the training of the decoder.
To sum up, in the reactive adversary model, as the user and the adversary are not aware of the encoding/decoding
strategies of the other, both of them are weak: the user can only maximize the accuracy performance of the composed
model but not know the privacy threat it will face. As to the proactive adversary model, both the user and the adversary
are stronger: the adversary, being aware of the power of the user, trains a decoder to compromise the user privacy
whereas the user not only seeks high accuracy but also satisfactory privacy performance against such an adversary.
6.3 Optimization
With the reward calculated for each state, we run the LSTM-based optimizer to find the optimal partition-compression
policy. Policy pi is represented by the LSTM-based network parameterized by w. At episode i, the policy is represented
by pi(wi). During each episode, we compute the action under the current state and policy, and transit to the next state.
To facilitate computation, M samples are rolled out for the given policy to compute the expected reward.
Algorithm 1 Reinforcement Learning (S,A, T , r, γ)
Input: a base DNN
Output: a new DNN and its placement
1: s0 ← The base DNN;
2: for i = 1 to N do
3: for j = 1 to M do
4: sj,0 = s0; {Set the initial state to s0.}
5: for t = 1 to L do
6: aj,t ∼ pi(sj,t−1;wi−1);
7: sj,t ← T (sj,t−1, aj,t);
8: end for
9: R← 1M
∑M
j=1 r(sj,L); {Use the average reward for the current policy.}
10: wi ← ∇wi−1J(wi−1);
11: end for
12: end for
Policy gradient method is used to update the policy in each episode. Specifically, the objective function for the policy
network is the expected reward over all sequences of actions a1:L, i.e.:
J(w) = Ea1:L∼Π(w)[R], (14)
where L is the length of the trajectory. REINFORCE policy gradient algorithm [28] is applied to train the policy
network. And we adopt a common trick called baseline to reduce the high variance in the gradient. Finally, Alg. 1
summarizes the reinforcement learning optimization procedure.
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Table 1: Compression Techniques
Name Replaced Structure New Structure Applied Layer Types
F1 (SVD) m× n weight matrix m× k and k × n(k  m) weight matrices FC layer
F2 (KSVD) same above same above with sparse matrices FC layer
F3 (Global Average Pooling) FC layers a global average pooling layer FC layer
C1 (MobileNet) Conv layer 3× 3 depth-wise Conv layer and 1× 1 point-wise Conv layer Conv layer
C2 (MobileNetV2) Conv layer same above with additional point-wise Conv layer and residual links Conv layer
C3 (SqueezeNet) Conv layer a Fire layer Conv layer
W1 (Pruning) any layer insignificant parameters pruned layer FC or Conv layer
W2 (Filter Pruning) Conv layer insignificant filters pruned Conv layer Conv layer
None C1 C3 C1+C3 F1 F2
9
20
30
Reactive Proactive
None C1 C3 C1+C3 F1 F2 None C1 C3 C1+C3 F1 F2
9
20
30
Compression Techniques
Pa
rti
tio
n L
ay
er
None C1 C3 C1+C3
9
20
30
 1
Figure 3: The visualization effect of reconstructed inputs reversed from different partitioning layers under a variety of
compression techniques on VGG-13, CIFAR-10. Reactive means the decoder only passively reconstructs the input from
features. Proactive means that the decoder and encoder pit against each other for retraining the model. We observe that
the reconstruction effect is poor when the partitioning layer is close to the output layer, especially when the model is
compressed. Proactive decoder has a worse reconstruction effect as the encoder is enhanced with retraining.
7 Evaluations
In this section, we show that our RL-based optimizer is able to find high-performance DNN structures achieving high
accuracy while leaking little unintended information about the inputs. The experimental results and visualization effect
on a variety of datasets and base neural networks demonstrate that the effectiveness of our method.
Setup: We choose the image classification tasks on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 to test our RL-based optimizer. Base
DNNs are the conventional models LeNet, AlexNet, VGG-11, VGG-13 and VGG-16. The decoder has an inverse
structure as of the encoder. The task on CIFAR-10 is to classify the 10-class color images and to prevent the feature
inversion attack. For any DNN selected by our strategy, we evaluate its accuracy by the classification error and privacy
by the MSE and SSIM of the reconstructed inputs. The task on CIFAR-100 is to classify the images into 20 superclasses
while not disclosing the fine class of each image. We evaluate the model accuracy by the classification accuracy of
20 superclasses attributes, and privacy by the classification error rate of the fine-class attributes. The latter can be
considered as preventing property inference attack.
We implement the most common compression techniques as listed in Table 1. The RL-based optimizer is implemented
by the machine learning framework PyTorch 1.1.0 and all experiments are done on Intel Xeon Processor with GPU
GeForce RTX 2080 Ti.
7.1 Implementation Details
In this section, we first introduce our two types of RL-based optimizers and then show the comparison methods.
RL-based Optimizer (reactive): The RL algorithm is trained for 200 episodes with a learning rate of 0.03 and a rollout
number 1. Within each episode, after applying the partition and compression techniques to the encoder, we retrain the
new model to minimize the accuracy loss for 1 epoch with a learning rate 0.001, and train the reactive decoder for 1
epoch with the same learning rate to minimize the privacy loss which is indicated by MSE or the negative value of
SSIM. After recording the reward and updating the controller, the next episode begins.
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RL-based Optimizer (proactive): Similar to that with reactive adversary, within one episode, we partition and
compress the DNN, and construct the decoder with an inverse structure of the encoder. We first train the cloud part for
5 epochs to minimize the model’s accuracy loss, and then train the decoder for 1 epoch to minimize the privacy loss.
Finally, we train the encoder for 5 epochs to minimize the accuracy loss and maximize the privacy loss at the same time,
and then repeat the entire procedure for the next episode. We observe that 200 episodes are sufficient to find the saddle
point. The training strategy is sufficient for the controller to distinguish different compressed models while not being
overburdening. The learning rates of the partition controller and compression controller are both set as 0.03 and the
rollout number is 1.
Comparison Methods: We first verify that RL-based optimizer exceeds other neural architecture search methods in
terms of performance. We adopt the grid search as a comparison method which computes the highest reward out of all
combination choices of partitioning layers and compression techniques. Note that doing an exhaustive search over all
choices is almost impossible (due to the difficulty for reward computation). Two adversarial training strategies also
apply to the grid search.
Beyond that, we also compare our approach against other privacy-preserving method — differential privacy, which adds
additional Gaussian noise to the intermediate-layer features at the inference phase. The random noise is drawn from
Gaussian distributions with 0 mean and standard deviation 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2 times of the mean magnitude of the features
respectively. We would like to show that, with our adaptation of the neural network, goals of accuracy, privacy, and
performance can be better achieved.
Table 2: Different compression techniques lead to different compression ratios and accuracies on AlexNet, CIFAR10.
Abase Compression Techniques CR A 4A
0.8679
10:C1 0.0224 0.8538 -1.62%
3:C3 6:C3 8:C3 10:C3 0.0859 0.8291 -4.47%
0:W1 3:W1 6:W1 8:W1 10:W1 0.0645 0.8393 -3.30%
0:W1 3:W1 6:W1 8:W1 10:C1 0.0701 0.8251 -4.93%
0:W2 3:W2 6:W2 8:W2 10:C1 0.0743 0.8153 -6.06%
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Figure 4: The impact of different compression and partition strategies on privacy measured by SSIM and MSE on
CIFAR-10. Figures share the same legend. (a): SSIM and MSE are negatively correlated. (b): SSIM is lower when the
partition layer is closer to the output layer of the model. (c)(d): SSIM (MSE) is higher (lower) when compression ratio
is low.
7.2 Results and Discussion
We first verify the impact of different compression techniques on neural networks, and then show the adversarial
retraining and the training process of reinforcement learning. Finally, we compare our search results with other methods.
Accuracy and Privacy vs. Compression and Partition. Compression Ratio is defined as
CR = 1− #params(compressed DNN)
#params(base DNN)
to indicate how much the model is compressed. We take AlexNet for example: when we divide AlexNet at the 12th layer
and apply different combinations of compression techniques up to that layer, we obtain different CRs and accuracies as
shown in Table 2. Further, from Fig. 4, we can tell that choices of partion layers and compression ratios have different
impact to the privacy performance. Data are collected from models including VGG-11, VGG-13, VGG-16, LeNet,
AlexNet, and ResNet-18. Remarkably, features closer to the input layer, or with a lower CR, tend to better reconstruct
the inputs and thus reveal more.
We also display the visualization effect of each reconstructed input restored from different features in Fig. 3. From left to
right, each image is reconstructed from features compressed by different techniques, when reactive or proactive training
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are applied. From top to bottom, each image is reconstructed from different partitioning layers. Overall, features closer
to the input layer have a better reconstruction effect, and one can hardly reconstruct input from proactively trained
features. The latter shows in proactive training, the encoder gradually learns how to shield information from the decoder.
Above all, different compression techniques and partitioning strategies indeed have various impacts on the accuracy and
privacy performance of a model.
Figure 5: We partition VGG-16 at Layer 13 (left) and at Layer 33 (right), and then use filter pruning to compress the
encoder. On the left side, the proactive decoder tries to maximize the SSIM to reconstruct the inputs. On the right side,
the proactive decoder tries to minimize its classification error on the fine-class attributes to infer input properties.
Adversarial Retraining. Fig. 5-(a)(c) demonstrate an example proactive retraining process on CIFAR-10, VGG-16.
As we observe, the overall model accuracy is high and stable throughout the training process, while the decoder and
encoder pit against each other on the privacy loss with the encoder at an advantage. Fig. 5-(b)(d) shows the proactive
retraining on CIFAR-100, VGG-16. The decoder accuracy decays at the 20th epoch as the encoder gets stronger. The
overall model accuracy remains stable.
Figure 6: The reinforcement learning processes of training VGG-11 on CIFAR-10 with the reactive decoder (a)(b), and
training VGG-16 on CIFAR-100 with the proactive decoder (c)(d).
Reinforcement Learning. Fig. 6 show the convergence of our RL-based optimizer. We follow the notations in Sec. 5
in presenting the results. From Fig. 6(a)(c), the model accuracy remains stable throughout the learning process, while
SSIM and the decoder accuracy decreases indicating an increase of the privacy level. That essentially suggests our
optimizer learns to select neural network structures and features which preserves input privacy without degrading the
model performance. Fig. 6(b)(d) show that the rewards increase with episodes until convergence.
Comparison with Grid Search. Table 3 shows our reinforcement learning based optimizer approach and as a
comparison, we did a grid search over the same search space, of which the results are given in Table 4. In both
tables, we show the strategies the two methods find out, and the resulting models’ accuracy A, privacy loss P1(P2),
performance indicator S1(S2) and reward R. Our RL-based optimizer achieves the highest reward in almost all cases,
with an average improvement of 8.35% over the grid search. While the model accuracies remain almost the same (with
moderate decreases in some cases), our privacy loss reduces by 13.22% on average compared to grid search. The
results demonstrate the effectiveness of RL-based optimizer in seeking neural network structures and placement which
preserve input privacy.
Comparison with Differential Privacy. To verify the strength of adapting neural network structures to privacy goals,
we also compare our approach against another privacy-preserving method. Differential privacy, as a conventional
method, inserts randomized noise to the partitioning layer without modifying the neural network structures. The
perturbed features are expected to preserve input privacy. Results are given in Table 5. To compare with Table 3, we
also calculate the performance indicator S1, privacy loss P1 and reward R of each model accordingly. In general,
feature perturbation reduces privacy loss over the base level, and the larger the standard deviation of the noise, the lower
11
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Table 3: Results of running reinforcement Learning based optimizer over different models and datasets: ∆gR,
∆gP1(∆gP2) are the reward gain and privacy loss reduction over the grid search method. ∆nR, ∆nP1(∆nP2) are
the reward gain and privacy loss reduction over the differential privacy method. The results show that our method is
superior in seeking a model structure that achieves a high reward and low privacy loss.
Model Partition Layer Compression Techniques A P1(P2) S1(S2) R ∆gR ∆gP1(∆gP2) ∆nR ∆nP1(∆nP2)
CIFAR-10
Reactive
VGG11 23 18:C2 22:C1 0.9108 0.4106 0.6808 0.5218 19.65% -22.53% 87.70% -35.36%
VGG13 0 0:C1 0.8298 0.3867 0.9999 0.5401 6.28% -14.82 % 36.63% -18.49%
VGG16 40
0:W1 3:W1 7:W1 10:W1 14:W1 17:W1
20:W1 24:W1 27:W1 30:W1 34:C1 37:C1 40:W1
0.9213 0.4049 0.7369 0.5430 1.08% -10.56% 15.93% -12.47%
AlexNet 13 8:W1 10:W1 0.8657 0.3803 0.9455 0.6163 3.49% -1.35%
Lenet 5 3:C3 0.7502 0.5300 0.9537 0.4678 5.41% 2.00%
AlexNet (S2) 10 6:W2 8:W2 10:W2 0.8524 0.3803 0.9099 0.6037 8.42% -8.18%
Lenet (S2) 10 0:W2 3:W2 0.6051 0.3806 0.8356 0.4848 17.16% -31.21%
CIFAR-10
Proactive
VGG11 13 0:C1 0.8344 0.3948 0.8959 0.5405 4.89% -3.64% 94.42% -37.85%
VGG13 26 0:C3 14:W1 21:W1 24:C3 0.8534 0.3997 0.8294 0.5279 2.98% 4.55% 34.22% -15.75%
VGG16 44
3:W2 10:W2 14:W2 17:W2 20:W2 24:W2
27:W2 30:W2 34:W2 37:W2 40:W2
0.9173 0.4160 0.6953 0.5171 -4.42% -1.75% 10.40% -10.07%
CIFAR-100
Proactive
VGG11 (P2) 3 none 0.7176 0.1706 0.9998 0.7876 2.03% 31.03%
VGG13 (P2) 33
0:W2 3:W2 7:W2 14:W2 17:W2 21:W2
24:W2 28:W2 31:W2
0.6387 0.037 0.6882 0.7237 18.83% -89.55%
VGG16(P2) 1 none 0.7741 0.1781 0.9997 0.8251 22.71% -25.95%
Table 4: Results of grid search over different models and datasets.
Model Partition Layer Compression Techniques Abase A P1 (P2) S1(S2) R
CIFAR-10
Reactive
VGG11 21 11:C1 18:C1 0.9241 0.8950 0.5300 0.7950 0.4361
VGG13 30 0:W1 3:W1 7:W1 10:W1 14:W1 17:W1 21:W1 24:W1 28:W1 0.9423 0.9353 0.4540 0.7502 0.5082
VGG16 33 0:W1 3:W1 7:W1 10:W1 14:W1 17:W1 20:W1 24:W1 27:W1 30:W1 0.9397 0.9282 0.4527 0.9200 0.5372
AlexNet 16 0:W1 3:W1 6:W1 8:W1 10:W1 14:F1 0.8679 0.8425 0.3855 0.9587 0.5955
LeNet 7 6:F1 0.7522 0.7189 0.5196 0.8176 0.4438
AlexNet (S2) 12 0:W1 3:W1 6:W1 8:W1 10:C1 0.8679 0.8251 0.4142 0.9867 0.5568
LeNet (S2) 7 0:W1 3:W1 6:W1 0.7522 0.7096 0.5533 0.8661 0.4138
CIFAR-10
Proactive
VGG11 14 0:C3 4:C3 8:C3 11:C3 0.9241 0.8227 0.4097 0.8609 0.5153
VGG13 20 0:C3 3:C3 7:C3 10:C3 14:C3 17:C3 0.9423 0.7974 0.3823 0.8613 0.5126
VGG16 33 0:W1 3:W1 7:W1 10:W1 14:W1 17:W1 20:W1 24:W1 27:W1 30:W1 0.9397 0.9090 0.4234 0.8269 0.5410
CIFAR-100
Proactive
VGG11 (P2) 21 0:W1 4:W1 8:W1 11:W1 15:W1 18:W1 0.7557 0.6889 0.1302 0.8372 0.7719
VGG13 (P2) 30 0:W1 3:W1 7:W1 10:W1 14:W1 17:W1 21:W1 24:W1 28:W1 0.7673 0.7717 0.3542 0.7502 0.6090
VGG16 (P2) 33 0:W2 3:W2 7:W2 10:W2 14:W2 17:W2 20:W2 24:W2 27:W2 30:W2 0.7711 0.6998 0.2405 0.8437 0.6724
Table 5: Results of applying differential privacy to the models: randomized Gaussian noises are inserted to the selected
partitioning layers. Base privacy loss is calculated on the original models and features. The mean of the inserted
Gaussian noise is 0, and the standard deviation is set to 0.1, 0.5, 1, and 2 times of the average feature magnitude. Reward
R is calculated according to Eq.12 for fair comparison.
Partition Layer Base Privacy Loss S1 P1(0.1x) R(0.1x) P1(0.5x) R(0.5x) P1(1x) R(1x) P1(2x) R(2x)
CIFAR-10
VGG11
7 0.9713 0.9918 0.9654 0.0346 0.9274 0.07267 0.9328 0.0672 0.8486 0.1514
14 0.8747 0.8958 0.8571 0.1414 0.8700 0.1286 0.8531 0.1453 0.8461 0.1522
21 0.7089 0.5122 0.7054 0.2245 0.6905 0.2358 0.6659 0.2546 0.6352 0.2780
CIFAR-10
VGG13
9 0.9401 0.9880 0.9587 0.0413 0.9460 0.0540 0.9106 0.0894 0.9074 0.0926
20 0.7904 0.8782 0.7947 0.2023 0.7999 0.1972 0.7811 0.2157 0.7752 0.2215
30 0.5272 0.5020 0.5116 0.3672 0.5060 0.3715 0.4900 0.3835 0.4744 0.3953
CIFAR-10
VGG16
13 0.9095 0.9823 0.9153 0.0847 0.8953 0.1047 0.8913 0.1086 0.8813 0.1186
23 0.7197 0.9221 0.7516 0.2468 0.7545 0.2440 0.7626 0.2359 0.7281 0.2703
33 0.5211 0.6416 0.5144 0.4233 0.5182 0.4199 0.4998 0.4360 0.4626 0.4684
the privacy loss. Interestingly, we found that while P1 decreases with an increase of the noise standard deviation, R
increases with it. That shows our reward function is well designed to reflect our privacy objective.
We choose the group with the highest reward (2x standard deviation) to compare with the RL-based approach. The
results are provided in Table 3. On average, the RL-based approach exceeds differential privacy by 46.43% in reward,
with a reduction of 21.67% in privacy loss. The result confirms that modifying the neural network structure can achieve
a higher level of privacy compared with feature perturbations.
8 Conclusion
For deep learning with the mobile cloud infrastructure, we propose to protect the sensitive information in the input data
from the perspective of the neural network. By proper partition, compression, and adversarial retraining, the neural
network can be adapted to yield far less privacy loss without much performance degradation. To achieve that, we
devise a reinforcement learning based optimizer to seek the best adaptation strategies. Although we formulate it as an
unconstrained optimization problem, it can be easily revised to a constrained optimization problem if a hard privacy
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guarantee is imposed. Experiments on various model structures have shown that the RL-based approach exceeds that of
grid search, as well as other privacy-preserving method such as differential privacy.
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